What happened between 1 and 10 October

On 9 October 2026 AK Parti members of parliament submitted to the Grand National Assembly the Bill on Certain Investment Funds Whose Liquidation Has Been Ordered, registered as Bill No. 2/3939 (text). According to the TBMM bill record, all 89 signatories belong to the AK Parti group. The bill was referred to the Planning and Budget Committee as lead committee, which has put it, as the only item, on its agenda for 14 October 2026 at 10:00.

The bill concerns the 131 funds of seven founders whose liquidation the Capital Markets Board (SPK) ordered on 17 September 2026. The background is set out in our separate legal note on the Tera Portföy fund liquidation. This piece covers what changed between 1 and 10 October and what the bill would do.

  • 1 October. The SPK announced an interim payment for the funds of Tera, Pusula, Atlas and Hedef, based on a "net investment amount" to be calculated by the Central Registry Agency (MKK), capped at TRY 1 million per investor for each fund separately, credited against the final amount and applied first to money market funds. No date was given.
  • 7 October. Addressing the General Assembly (transcript), the Vice President said that the 17 funds of A1 Capital, Bulls and Pardus would be paid under ordinary liquidation rules that Thursday (43,643 investors); that Atlas's 16 funds (56,614 people) could follow if collateral were obtained; that the interim payment needed legislation ("if the draft bill is enacted, we expect payments of principal up to TRY 1 million to be made within October"); that final liquidation would take five to six months; and that "no Treasury resources will be used".
  • 8 October. According to a Directorate of Communications statement reported in the press, Ziraat Bankası transferred the proceeds of those 17 funds to the banks and brokers holding investors' accounts. TEFAS data for 9 October show all 17 portfolios reduced to residual amounts.
  • 9 October. Bill 2/3939 was submitted. An earlier single-signature bill by a Yeni Parti member, No. 2/3895, proposing an independent liquidation board and an "equal treatment date", remains in committee and is not on the agenda.

SPK bulletins of 3 and 7 October contained no new liquidation decision. As of 10 October the interim payment for the Tera, Pusula, Atlas and Hedef funds had not started.

The bill at a glance

The bill has nine articles. It does not amend the Capital Markets Law No. 6362, the Banking Law No. 5411 or the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271; it is a stand-alone, case-specific statute that borrows from them. Article 1(2) says so expressly: it "does not create a general or permanent liquidation and liability regime" for other funds.

Under Article 2(1)(b), a "fund" is one whose liquidation the SPK ordered on 17 September 2026 and whose liquidation is not completed on the date the law is published. If the liquidation of the 17 funds paid on 8 October is formally completed before publication, the law will not reach them; no completion date has been announced. The reasoning states that payments will come only from fund assets and recovered amounts, with no public or budget resources.

Article by article

Articles 1–3: scope, unitholders and the payment bar

A "unitholder" is the person whose right to payment is established by reconciling the records of MKK, Takasbank, TEFAS, custodians, distributors and the liquidator, fund by fund and account by account. The SPK supervises the liquidation and sets stages, valuation, interim and final payments and the order of distribution. Where the exchange price does not reflect real value or would delay liquidation, it may order buy-backs, use of the right to sell to the controlling shareholder, wholesale sales, special transaction notifications, temporary price margins and similar methods, and approve off-exchange sales, and may bar buyers from reselling on the exchange for a period. Institutions must provide information and cannot rely on confidentiality rules to refuse.

Article 3(6) applies where the acts in Articles 104, 106 or 107 of Law No. 6362 were committed "by the funds, or by acting together with these funds, or with the participation of the funds". In that case, no payment is made from the liquidation or the recovery account to the persons and institutions "determined by the Board" to have committed those acts or to have acted together with those who did. Article 104 covers market-disruptive acts, which are administrative infringements (kabahat) punished by fines. Articles 106 and 107 are the criminal offences of insider dealing and market manipulation. The determination is made by the SPK alone. The bill requires no court ruling and provides no objection procedure.

Article 4(1): the net investment amount

Article 4 is triggered by a cash shortfall: where distributable cash cannot cover all units at the unit price valid at the end of the day before the liquidation decision (with decisions dated 17 September, that is 16 September 2026), payments follow the "net investment amount". Each cash inflow and outflow actually made is updated to the liquidation date using "the arithmetic average of the rates of change in the consumer price index and the domestic producer price index" published by TurkStat, pro rata temporis (kıstelyevm); where inflows exceed outflows, each outflow is deducted first-in, first-out. MKK calculates it. The reasoning stresses that the amount "does not create a new claim that determines the investor's final entitlement in advance"; it is a ceiling and distribution criterion for the shortfall stage.

Article 4(2)–(3): interim payments and small investors first

In funds the SPK designates, an interim payment may be made from the relevant fund's liquidation assets: the full net investment amount below TRY 1,000,000, at most TRY 1,000,000 above it. Because the payment is made from the relevant fund's assets, the cap applies per investor in each fund, which is also how the SPK's 1 October announcement puts it ("for each fund separately"). The reasoning's reference to a maximum "per person" should be read in that light. It may not exceed the unindexed net investment amount and, except in money market funds, may not exceed the value of the units in the account at the end of the previous day, at a Takasbank-calculated price. It is credited against the final payment, and units are returned only at the end.

If cash falls short, the SPK may pay starting from the lowest net investment amount and/or set a minimum interim amount for everyone, "so that the largest possible number of unitholders benefit in full". No one may receive more than their net investment amount, their rights calculated as of the day before the calculation or liquidation date, or TRY 1 million.

Article 4(4)–(5): voluntary returns and deduction of other recoveries

Those who redeemed before liquidation at values "contrary to reality" may voluntarily return gains above a benchmark return of comparable funds; those who profited from portfolio shares whose prices the SPK finds were artificial may return gains above the normal index return. The reasoning says this is not an amnesty and not an admission. Under Article 4(5), "payments previously made to the unitholder from the liquidation assets, the recovery account or other legal avenues" are deducted at the final payment. Civil claims are not barred, but what they recover reduces the final liquidation payment.

Article 5: personal liability and TMSF collection

Value moved out of a fund through transactions that breach the rules, or comply in form but lack a genuine economic purpose for the fund (sham or unfunded loans, guarantees, assignments, sales, repos and the like), is deemed unlawfully extracted. The founding portfolio manager is liable first; if recovery fails or clearly will fail, the persons whose responsibility the SPK determines, and those found to have acted with them, are personally liable, even after leaving office. For cases not covered by Article 6 (seizure and confiscation), the SPK determines the loss, the liable persons and their amounts fund by fund, and notifies TMSF. TMSF collects under Law No. 6183 on the Collection of Public Receivables with powers drawn from Law No. 5411; Istanbul administrative courts hear related actions.

Article 6: seized assets and the recovery account

Seizure under Article 128 of Law No. 5271 is available in related investigations, and SPK reports supporting its criminal complaints count as the report that article requires. Cash and instruments that can lawfully be returned go to the fund or the recovery account under Article 131. TMSF may be appointed trustee over other assets and sell them "without waiting for the outcome of the case". Confiscated assets that a court links to a fund go to the fund, not the Treasury. The recovery account at TMSF is held separately for each fund and "cannot be attached even for public receivables"; after liquidation, the Investor Compensation Centre (YTM) pays it out "in proportion to unitholding". That is a pro rata basis, not the net investment amount, and YTM acts as payment agent rather than under its compensation regime.

Articles 7–9: implementation and entry into force

The SPK makes the implementing rules, and it and YTM may hire outside legal, accounting and software services. Article 8: "This Law shall enter into force on the date of its publication, with effect from 17/9/2026."

Worked illustrations: all figures hypothetical

The index figures below are assumptions chosen for easy arithmetic. They are not TurkStat data and are not predictions. The "liquidation date" is taken as 17 September 2026. The bill does not define it; its use of the term in Article 4(3) (rights calculated as of the day before the liquidation date) and Article 4(4) (redemptions "up to the liquidation date") suggests the date of the decisions, but this is our assumption.

Example 1: two investments, one withdrawal

An investor in an equity-heavy fund put in TRY 400,000 on 15 March 2025 and TRY 300,000 on 15 January 2026, and withdrew TRY 250,000 on 15 June 2026. Assume average index uplifts to the liquidation date of 40%, 20% and 6% respectively.

  • Reading A (one reading of the article's wording, which updates "each cash inflow and outflow" to the liquidation date and then deducts outflows FIFO): 560,000 + 360,000 − 265,000 = TRY 655,000. FIFO changes only which tranche is reduced, not the total.
  • Reading B (the reasoning's worked example: "the outflow amount will first be deducted from the oldest inflow; the remaining inflows will be updated" to the liquidation date): (400,000 − 250,000) × 1.40 + 360,000 = TRY 570,000.

The same facts produce a TRY 85,000 difference. Neither the text nor the reasoning acknowledges a difference, and the two may be meant to describe the same method; whether they actually diverge is an open question that MKK's algorithm or a committee amendment may settle. For the interim payment, the ceiling is the unindexed amount, 400,000 + 300,000 − 250,000 = TRY 450,000. As this is not a money market fund, the value of the remaining units also caps it. If they are worth an assumed TRY 180,000 at the previous day's Takasbank price, the interim payment cannot exceed TRY 180,000. In a money market fund the ceiling would be TRY 450,000, subject to cash.

Example 2: the Government's own example

The Vice President described an investor who put in TRY 1 million, saw it grow to 5 million and withdrew 4 million: "we consider that this person has withdrawn the principal; we will not pay that." With assumed uplifts of 30% on the inflow and 10% on the outflow, indexed outflows (4.4 million) exceed inflows (1.3 million). The deduction rule in Article 4(1) is written only for the case where inflows exceed outflows, so the formula yields no positive net investment amount and, on the Government's account, there would be no interim payment. The bill does not expressly say what such an investor receives at the final stage for units still shown on the statement.

Example 3: not enough cash

A fund has an assumed TRY 1.2 million for interim payments and three holders with capped entitlements of TRY 100,000, 400,000 and 1,000,000. Paying from the smallest upward gives 100,000, 400,000 and 700,000. A minimum interim payment of, say, TRY 300,000 gives 100,000, 300,000 and 300,000, leaving 500,000 for a later round. The SPK may use either method or both.

What the bill does not address

  • Unexecuted redemption orders (paragraph A/6). The SPK's 17 September rules book unexecuted TEFAS sell orders as a fund liability paid with priority. On 28 September the SPK stated that orders given on 17 September and cancelled by TEFAS will be paid pro rata, while orders sent on or before 16 September but not executed because of default or a missing price fall within A/6. The bill mentions neither. It does not say whether holders of such orders are paid as unitholders under the net investment formula or as creditors ahead of distribution.
  • Custodians and distributors. Article 5 targets the portfolio manager and persons the SPK holds responsible. It makes no specific provision on the liability of custodians or of the banks and brokers that sold the units.
  • Investor procedure. There is no route to see or contest the MKK calculation, no payment deadline and no transitional rule for actions against the SPK's September decisions.
  • Funds closed but not in liquidation are outside its scope.

Constitutional questions

The following are questions, not conclusions. Whether any of them matters depends on the final text and its application.

  • Retroactivity (Article 2). Article 8 applies the law from 17 September. Was the pro rata distribution under the SPK's rules a vested position that a later statute cannot displace retroactively, or part of an ongoing process the legislature may reshape? And how would it affect challenges brought, or yet to be brought, against the SPK's decisions?
  • Property (Articles 35 and 13). Moving from unit value to net investment shifts a limited pool from holders with paper gains to those with losses. The reasoning relies on the risk that past values were artificial. Is that risk shown fund by fund, including money market funds whose prices were not questioned, and is the interference proportionate?
  • Equality (Article 10). The bill distinguishes funds with and without enough cash, money market funds from other funds, and funds completed before publication from those still in liquidation. Are those distinctions based on objective and reasonable grounds?
  • Presumption of innocence (Article 38(4)). No one may be considered guilty until proven guilty by a court judgment. Article 3(6) excludes from payment persons the SPK "determines" to have committed, in connection with the funds, acts that are crimes under Articles 106 and 107 or administrative infringements under Article 104. Is the exclusion a sanction? The bill names no procedure, right of defence or objection route; how would review work? Is "acting together" defined precisely enough? Similar questions arise for liability under Article 5 and for sales of seized assets before judgment under Article 6.
  • Access to court (Articles 36 and 125). Ordinary judicial review remains, but the bill does not address how it relates to payment rounds.

After publication, the President, the two largest parliamentary groups or one-fifth of the members of parliament may bring an annulment action within 60 days (Constitution Articles 150–151), and courts may refer provisions in pending cases (Article 152).

Comparative perspective

The underlying choice is familiar. In the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, the trustee valued claims by a "net investment method" (deposits less withdrawals) rather than the last statement. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld that method in 2011 (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 654 F.3d 229) because the statements showed fictitious profits, and in 2015 declined to add an inflation or interest adjustment (SIPC v. 2427 Parent Corp., 779 F.3d 74). The Turkish bill makes the same basic choice by statute, adds indexation and confines it to cash shortfalls.

Korea took another route after the Lime Asset Management failure. On 30 June 2020 the Financial Supervisory Service's dispute mediation committee recommended a full refund of principal for trade-finance fund investors who bought after November 2018, on the ground of rescission for mistake under Article 109 of the Korean Civil Act, with the burden on the banks and securities firms that sold the product. The recommendation was not binding in itself; four of the distributors accepted it on 27 August 2020. The contrast is instructive: the Turkish bill reallocates among investors and pursues managers and those the SPK holds responsible, but makes no specific provision for sellers.

Timetable and what to watch

The Planning and Budget Committee meets on 14 October 2026 at 10:00 and may amend the text. The bill then goes to the General Assembly (no date set) and takes effect on publication in the Official Gazette. After that, the SPK must adopt implementing rules and designate funds, and MKK must run its calculation. The Government's aim of interim payments "within October" depends on all of these steps. In committee, watch whether:

  • unexecuted orders (A/6) and the 28 September SPK statement are addressed;
  • the indexation method and the "liquidation date" are clarified;
  • investors gain access to their MKK calculation and a way to object;
  • Article 3(6) gains a procedure, a standard of proof and a review route;
  • the reasoning's "per person" wording is aligned with the per-fund cap;
  • a transitional rule covers litigation brought before entry into force.

Frequently asked questions

Is the bill law?

No. As of 10 October 2026 it is before the Planning and Budget Committee and may change.

Could it change what an investor ultimately receives?

In funds with a cash shortfall, yes. Distribution would follow the net investment amount, not unit value. Final payments are made net of everything already received.

Does suing the manager forfeit the interim payment?

The bill contains no such condition. Civil claims are not barred, but under Article 4(5) amounts they recover are deducted at the final payment.

Will the state cover any shortfall?

Not under the bill. Both the reasoning and the Vice President's statement exclude public resources.

Burhan Doğuş Ayparlar's View

This section sets out my personal assessment as the founder of this site and an attorney at law (Türkiye).

The bill addresses a real problem. When recorded values may be artificial and cash is short, paying on statement value rewards whoever held the most inflated figure. A net investment rule, priority for smaller amounts, a ring-fenced recovery account and a path for seized assets to reach investors rather than the Treasury are coherent responses, and the US courts in the Madoff liquidation reached a broadly similar answer.

My reservations concern precision rather than direction. The text and the reasoning appear to describe two different indexation methods. The ceiling rule that separates money market funds from other funds will not be obvious to many investors. Unexecuted redemption orders, which the SPK's own rules treat as a priority liability, are left to administrative interpretation. Each of these could be settled in committee with a sentence or two, and settling them now would mean fewer disputes later.

Article 3(6) and Article 5 need the most careful drafting. Excluding participants in manipulation from a scheme built for other investors is understandable. Where the trigger is an administrative determination rather than a judgment, however, the law should state the procedure, the right to be heard and the consequences of a later acquittal or annulment. I expect the constitutional debate to centre on those provisions and on retroactivity, rather than on the net investment principle itself.

This article is for information only and does not constitute legal advice. It is based on the text and reasoning of Bill No. 2/3939 as submitted on 9 October 2026, TBMM bill records and the committee agenda, the General Assembly transcript of 7 October 2026, and SPK announcements and bulletins up to 10 October 2026. The 8 October payments rely on a government statement reported in the press and on public TEFAS data. The comparative section relies on the cited US decisions and Korean press reports. All numerical examples are hypothetical, and their index rates are assumptions. The bill may be amended or may not be enacted. Statements about Turkish law are general in nature; specific cases require individual assessment. The analysis and assessments are the author's own.